



ANOMALY-BASED DETECTION APPROACH TO 
DETECT THE FLASH CROWD ATTACK 

























ANOMALY-BASED DETECTION APPROACH TO 
DETECT THE FLASH CROWD ATTACK 

















Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements 
 for the degree of 
















To my appreciated father "Dr. Abdulsada Mutlag Al-Saleem." 
To my dearest mother "Dr. Noria Flayyh Al-Joboori."  
To my beloved wife "Marwah Abdulmonem Jameel." 
To my lovely son "Mohammed Rayyan." 
To my dearest sister "Samarah." 









 بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم
ن نََّشاء َوفَْوَق ُكلِّ ِذي ِعْلٍم َعلِيم  } {67- سورة يوسف}  {نَْرفَُع َدَرَجاٍت مِّ
All praise and thanks are due to ALLAH SUBHANAH WA TAALA, the 
Lord of the world, for giving me the health, strength, knowledge and patience to 
complete this work. 
Since the Prophet MOHAMMED "Peace be Upon Him" said: „Whoever does 
not thank people (for their favours) has not thanked Allah (properly)‟, therefore, 
First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. 
Selvakumar Manickam for giving me full support and faithfulness in all guidance 
and commitments upon on effort from the early stages of this study through to the 
completion of this thesis. His wide knowledge and understanding have been 
invaluable to me especially in giving constructive comments and advice throughout 
this study. Furthermore, my appreciation and sincere gratitude go to the co-
supervisor Dr. Mohammed Anbar for his diversified help, support and the 
encouragement along with his contribute to complete the thesis. 
I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to all the academic staffs in 
National Advanced IPv6 Centre (NAv6), Universiti Sains Malaysia for their 
dedication and persistent support.  Besides that, the administration and support 
staffs inNAv6 deserve a great mention for keeping everything running smoothly.  
My sincere, heartfelt gratitude to my parents, Dr. Abdulsada Mutlag and Dr. 
Nooriya Flayyih, Sister Samara Abdulsada, my wonderful wife Marwah Al-Mufti 
and my lovely son, Mohammed Rayyan for their endless love, help, and 
encouragement during this study period especially when I have endured a period of 




Last but not least, collective and individual acknowledgments are also owed 
to my friends and colleagues in NAv6 who have helped and supported me over these 
years, especially Dr. Esraa Saleh Hasoon for assisting me in collecting my data to 
verify the work and the results and being there whenever I need. 
 
Samer Abdulsada Mutlag Al-Saleem 










Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………... iv 
List of Tables ………………...……………………………………………………...ix 
List of Figures.……………………………………………………………………….xi 
List of Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………xiii 
Abstrak ………………………………………………………………….………….xiv 
Absract …………………………………………………………………………….xvi 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Internet Security Issues ....................................................................................... 1 
1.2.1 Malware ..................................................................................................... 5 
1.2.2 Botnet ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) ...... 7 
1.2.4 Flash Event and Flash Crowds Attacks ................................................... 10 
1.3 Research Motivation ......................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Research Problem ............................................................................................. 13 
1.5 Research Objectives and Goal .......................................................................... 13 
1.6 Research Contributions ..................................................................................... 14 
1.7 Research Scope ................................................................................................. 14 
1.8 Research Methodology ..................................................................................... 15 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction....................................................................................................... 18 
2.2 Underlying Concept of Flash Event ................................................................. 18 
2.2.1 Flash Event Classification ....................................................................... 21 
2.3 Flash Crowd Attacks......................................................................................... 25 
2.3.1 Classification of Flash Crowds Attack .................................................... 26 
2.4 Approaches of Detecting Flash Crowd Attacks................................................ 31 
2.4.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) ........................................................... 31 
2.4.1(a) Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System (SBIDS)………..33 
2.4.1(b)  Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System (ABIDS)……….34 
2.4.1(c)  Artificial Neural Network-Based IDS (ANNIDS)……………35 
2.4.1(d) Threshold-Based IDS.…………………………………………36 
2.4.2 Features Reduction for Detecting Flash Crowd Attacks ......................... 38 
2.4.2(a)  Feature Ranking ………………………………………………42 
2.4.2(b) Feature Selection ……………………………………………...44 
2.5 Supervised Learning V.S Unsupervised Learning Methods............................. 47 
2.5.1 K-Means Clustering Algorithm ............................................................... 47 
2.6 Detection Techniques of Flash Crowd Attacks ................................................ 48 
2.6.1 User-Browsing Behaviour-Based Detection Techniques ........................ 49 
2.6.2 Scheme-Based Detection Techniques of Flash Crowd Attacks .............. 52 
2.6.3 Statistics-Based Detection Techniques ................................................... 54 
2.7 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 57 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH 




3.2 Overview of the Proposed Approach ................................................................ 60 
3.3 Proposed Approach for Detection the Flash Crowd Attack in Flash Event ..... 62 
3.3.1 Web-Log Retrieval and Data Filtering (phase 1) .................................... 63 
3.3.1(a) Data Pre-processing……………………………………………64 
3.3.1(b) GET-Log Recognition ………………………………………...69 
3.3.2 Data Dimension Reduction (Phase 2) ..................................................... 70 
3.3.2(a) Field Ranking …………………………………………………71 
3.3.2(b) Feature Selection ……………………………………………...72 
3.3.3 Anomaly-Based Behaviour Detection (Phase 3) ..................................... 73 
3.3.3(a) IP Aggregation Module ……………………………………….74 
3.3.3(b) An Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)……...75 
3.3.3(c) Rule-Based Anomaly Behaviour Detection …………………..76 
3.3.4 Verification of Flash Crowd Attacks Detection (Phase 4) ...................... 77 
3.3.4(a) K-Mean-Based Anomaly detection …………………………...77 
3.4 Summary ........................................................................................................... 82 
CHAPTER 4 PROPOSED APPROACH IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 Overview........................................................................................................... 83 
4.2 Tools and Technologies .................................................................................... 83 
4.2.1 Apache Web Server ................................................................................. 83 
4.2.2 My-Structured Query Language (MySQL) ............................................. 84 
4.2.3 VMware vSphere..................................................................................... 84 
4.2.4 WEKA ..................................................................................................... 85 
4.2.5 DoSHTTP ................................................................................................ 85 




4.3.1 Overview of Test-Bed Design ................................................................. 87 
4.3.1(a) A HTTP Botnet Test-bed Description ………………………...88 
4.3.1(b) B. Botnet Test-bed Network Architecture …………………….88 
4.3.2 Datasets ................................................................................................... 89 
4.3.3 Dataset Evaluation................................................................................... 91 
4.4 Design of the Approach for Detecting the Flash Crowd Attack in Flash Events
 ………………..……………………………………………………………….93 
4.4.1 Design of Web Log Retrieval and Data Filtering (Phase 1). .................. 94 
4.4.1(a) Design of Data Pre-Processing Module ………………………95 
4.4.1(b) Design of Get-Log Recognition …………………..…………100 
4.4.2 Design of Dimension Reduction ........................................................... 101 
4.4.2(a) Design of Field Ranking …………………..…………………102 
4.4.2(b) Design of Field Selection ……………………..……………..104 
4.4.3 Design of Anomaly-Based Behavior detection ..................................... 107 
4.4.4 K-mean .................................................................................................. 110 
4.5 Summary ......................................................................................................... 112 
CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULT ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Overview......................................................................................................... 114 
5.2 Experimental Design and Consideration ........................................................ 114 
5.2.1 Test-bed Description ............................................................................. 116 
5.2.2 Hardware and Software Specification for the Proposed Approach....... 117 
5.3 Evaluation Metrics .......................................................................................... 118 
5.4 Proposed Approach Tests Scenarios ............................................................... 120 




5.4.1(a) Scenario 1- Nav6 Dataset Scenario ………………………….121 
5.4.1(b) Scenario 2- Flash Event Dataset ……………………………..126 
5.4.1(c) Scenario 3-Flash Crowd Attach Dataset ……………………..130 
5.4.2 The Verification of The Proposed Approach Using K-Mean 
Algorithm……………………………………………………………...135 
5.4.3 Comparative Experiments (Comparison With Saravanan Approach) .. 138 
5.4.4 Comparison Detection Accuracy Between The Proposed Approach And 
Saravanan Approach ............................................................................. 139 
5.5 Summary ......................................................................................................... 140 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH WORK 
6.1 Overview......................................................................................................... 141 
6.2 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 141 






LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table ‎1.1:  Research Scope and limitation 15 
Table ‎2.1:  A Comparison Between Signature-based and Anomaly -
based Methods 35 
Table ‎3.1:  Access Log Format 66 
Table ‎3.2:  HTTP Request Methods 69 
Table ‎3.3:  The features that have considered for the Proposed approach 73 
Table ‎4.1:  Virtual Machine Description 88 
Table ‎4.2:  The Strategy of Splitting the Data 93 
Table ‎4.3:  The Field Ranking Value Depending on IGR Method 103 
Table ‎5.1:  Botnet Setting 116 
Table ‎5.2:  Apache Web Server Setting 117 
Table ‎5.3:  Abbreviations Used in Comparison Equation 119 
Table ‎5.4:  IDS Classifications Alerts 120 
Table ‎5.5:  The dataset details 121 
Table ‎5.6:  The Rule-based behavior detection result 124 
Table ‎5.7:  Detection Accuracy of Scenario One 125 
Table ‎5.8:  The NASA dataset details 126 
Table ‎5.9:  Threshold value of NASA dataset in different time 127 
Table ‎5.10:  Result of Rule-based Anomaly Detection 128 
Table ‎5.11:  Accuracy Detection Result of Scenario Two 130 
Table ‎5.12:  Parameters to Initiate Flash Crowd Attack 131 
Table ‎5.13:  Apache Web Server Parameters 131 




Table ‎5.15:  The IP Aggregation Result 133 
Table ‎5.16:  The Rule-Based Anomaly Detection Result. 134 
Table ‎5.17:  Detection Accuracy of Scenario Three 135 
Table ‎5.18:  Example of The Input Features in K-Mean 136 
Table ‎5.19:  K-Mean Algorithm Parameters 137 
Table ‎5.20:  K-Mean Algorithm  Detection Accuracy Result 137 







LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure ‎1.1:  Number of Hosts Connected to the Internet 2 
Figure ‎1.2:  Number of Vulnerabilities Reported Over 20 Years 3 
Figure ‎1.3:  Botnet Scenario 7 
Figure ‎1.4:  DDoS Attack 9 
Figure ‎1.5:  Step of Research Methodology 15 
Figure ‎2.1:  Survey of DDoS Attacks (http://www.arbornetworks.com/) 20 
Figure ‎2.2:  The Categories of Flash Crowd 21 
Figure ‎2.3:  Hourly Hits Following the Death of Steve Jobs 22 
Figure ‎2.4:  The Three-way TCP Handshake 28 
Figure ‎2.5:  Flash Crowd Classification 31 
Figure ‎2.6:  The Diagram of the Detection of Flash Crowd Attacks 
Approaches 49 
Figure ‎3.1:  General Structure of the Proposed Framework 61 
Figure ‎3.2:  Proposed Approach Architecture 63 
Figure ‎3.3 : Diagram of Data Pro-Processing Step 65 
Figure ‎3.4  The Standard Format for Common Log 67 
Figure ‎3.5  Web Access Log 67 
Figure ‎3.6  Diagram of GET-Log Recognition 69 
Figure ‎3.7  Building Dataset for the Proposed Framework 71 
Figure ‎3.8  Pseudo Code for Rule-Based Anomaly Behaviour Detection 77 
Figure ‎3.9  Direct k-means clustering algorithm 80 
Figure ‎3.10  Steps of K-means clustering algorithm. 81 




Figure ‎4.2:  Snapshot for DoSHTTP 86 
Figure ‎4.3:   Virtual Machine (VMware) System 87 
Figure ‎4.4:  HTTP-Botnet Test-Bed Structure 89 
Figure ‎4.5:  Common Way to Split the Data 91 
Figure ‎4.6:  Design of the Proposed Approach 94 
Figure ‎4.7:  Snapshot of Common Web Log Format 95 
Figure ‎4.8:  Example of formalization the Dataset 96 
Figure ‎4.9:  Dataset Before and After Data Cleansing 97 
Figure ‎4.10:  An Example of Data Formalization 98 
Figure ‎4.11:  Design of Pre-processing Module 99 
Figure ‎4.12:  Design of Get-Loge Recognition 101 
Figure ‎4.13:  Design of Dimension Reduction Module 102 
Figure ‎4.14:  Weka Snapshot of Fields Ranking Output using IGR 104 
Figure ‎4.15:  Snapshot of PCA Method 106 
Figure ‎4.16:  Fields Before and After Dimension Reduction 107 
Figure ‎4.17:  Design of IP Aggregation Module 109 
Figure ‎4.18:  Design of Rule-Based Detection Module. 110 
Figure ‎5.1:  IP Aggregation Result 123 
Figure ‎5.2:  The Anomaly IP Addresses that deduct by the Proposed 
approach 125 
Figure ‎5.3:  The Result of The IP Aggregation Step 128 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACO Ant Colony Optimization 
ADM Angular Directional Model 
AODV Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
ARIB Association of Radio Industries and Businesses 
ASK Amplitude Shift Keying 
ASTAR Anchor-based Street and Traffic Aware Routing 
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 
AWGN Additive While Gaussian Noise 
BER Bit Error Rate 
BIT Beacon Interval Time 
B-MFR Border-node based MFR 
BPS Bit per Symbol 
BPSK Binary Phase-Shift Keying 
BSS Basic Service Set 
C2C-CC Car-to-Car-Communication Consortium 
CALM Communications Access for Land Mobiles 
CAR Connectivity Aware Routing 
CDF Cumulative Density Function 
CEN European Committee for Standardization 
CLWPR Cross-Layer Weighted, Position-based Routing protocol 
CMGR Connectivity-Aware Minimum-Delay Geographic Routing 
CR Compass Routing 




PENDEKATAN PENGESANAN ANOMALI UNTUK MENGESAN 
SERANGAN FLASH CROWD SEMASA PERISTIWA KILAT 
 
ABSTRAK 
Sepanjang dekad yang lalu, ancaman keselamatan yang paling mengganggu di 
Internet adalah Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS). Pada masa ini, di antara 
semua jenis serangan DDoS pada lapisan aplikasi, serangan flash crowd yang 
mensasarkan pelayan web semasa peristiwa kilat adalah dianggap paling mencabar; 
oleh itu, melindungi pelayan web daripada jenis serangan tersebut telah menjadi 
masalah kritikal yang sangat perlu ditangani. Matlamat tesis ini adalah untuk 
mencadangkan satu pendekatan yang dapat mengesan serangan flash crowd yang 
menyasarkan pelayan web semasa peristiwa kilat. Pendekatan yang dicadangkan 
terdiri daripada empat fasa untuk mencapai matlamat penyelidikan. Pendekatan yang 
dicadangkan telah dinilai menggunakan tiga set data yang tersebar di tiga senario. 
Senario pertama adalah bertujuan untuk mengesahkan ketepatan pengesanan 
pendekatan yang dicadangkan apabila pelayan web berada dalam keadaan biasa 
(ketika tidak ada ancaman yang mensasarkan pelayan web). Senario kedua (set data 
peristiwa kilat) bertujuan untuk meningkatkan ketepatan pendekatan yang 
dicadangkan dalam mengesan tingkah laku anomali apabila pelayan web menghadapi 
peristiwa kilat. Senario ketiga (set data serangan flash crowd) bertujuan untuk 
mengesahkan ketepatan pendekatan yang dicadangkan dari segi mengesan serangan 
flash crowd yang mensasarkan pelayan web semasa peristiwa kilat. Kajian ini 
mempertimbangkan keperluan untuk mengesan tingkah laku anomali semasa 
serangan di mana ia boleh digunakan untuk mengesan permintaan yang berniat jahat 
dan meningkatkan keselamatan rangkaian. Sumbangan utama penyelidikan ini adalah 




crowd semasa peristiwa kilat. Hasil dan penilaiannya menunjukkan dengan jelas 
bahawa pendekatan yang dicadangkan dapat mengesan serangan flash crowd semasa 
peristiwa kilat dengan ketepatan 98% dari segi mengesan tingkahlaku anomali dan 







ANOMALY-BASED DETECTION APPROACH TO DETECT THE FLASH 




Over the last decade, the most intrusive security threat on the Internet is the 
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS). Currently, among all types of application-
layer DDoS attacks, the flash crowd attack that targets a web server during the flash 
event is considered the most challenging; therefore, protecting web servers from such 
type of attacks has become a critical problem that urgently needs to be addressed. 
The goal of the thesis is to propose an approach that can detect flash crowd attacks 
that target web servers during flash events. The proposed approach consists of four 
phases to achieve the goal of the research. The proposed approach is evaluated using 
three different datasets distributed in three scenarios. The first scenario is aimed to 
validate the detection accuracy of the proposed approach when a web server is in a 
normal situation (when there is no threat targeting the server). The second scenario 
(flash event dataset) is aimed to improve the accuracy of the proposed approach in 
detecting anomalous behaviour when the server is facing a flash event. The third 
scenario (flash crowd attack dataset) is aimed to verify and validate the accuracy of 
the proposed approach in terms of detecting the flash crowd attack that targets the 
web server during the flash event. The main contribution of this research is to 
promote an approach that responds to detect flash crowd attack requests during the 
flash event. The result and its evaluation clearly demonstrate that the proposed 
approach can detect the flash crowd attack during the flash event with an accuracy of 
98% in terms of detecting the anomalous behaviour and 100% in terms of detecting 





CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis discusses the design of a framework for the detection of flash crowd 
attacks that occur against web servers during flash events. In this chapter, an 
introduction to Internet security is presented with discussions focusing on malware, 
botnet, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and flash events and flash crowd 
attacks in Sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, and 1.2.4, respectively. Sections 1.3, 1.4, and 
1.5 present the research motivation, problem, and objectives, respectively. The scope 
of this thesis is stated in Section 1.6, and the research contributions of this study are 
presented in Section 1.7. Section 1.8 presents the research methodology. The 
organisation of this thesis is summarised in Section 1.9. 
1.2 Internet Security Issues  
In the past decade, the Internet has become the popular way to provide information 
and services to users dynamically (Angrishi, 2017). Figure 1.1 shows the number of 
hosts interconnected through the Internet over 10 years, indicating the increasing 
influence of the Internet on society. 






Figure 1.1: Number of Hosts Connected to the Internet  
  
One of the major and widely used services after the email is the World Wide 
Web (WWW). The first-generation web was severely limited in its ability to provide 
any more information than a brochure one might receive in the mail. The rapid 
growth of the web can be attributed to the changes in traditional roles and in the way 
business is conducted using the web, allowing all transactions through the Internet 
(Berners-Lee & Cailliau, 1990). For example, the government uses the Internet to 
provide its citizens many information and governmental services. Furthermore, the 
web enables companies to share and exchange information among their divisions, 
suppliers, partners, and customers to increase operational efficiency. Research and 
educational institutions depend on the Internet as a medium for collaboration to 
enhance their research discoveries.  
The Internet is an international collection of independent networks owned and 
operated by many organisations, and no central authority exists through which it can 
regulate the behaviour of its users. Therefore, network attacks have become more 




to remote attacks (disruption or disabling of one or more targets, such as web 
servers).  
According to statistics (TEAM, 2015), only 171 vulnerabilities were reported 
in 1995. The number of vulnerabilities increased to 7,236 by 2007. This number 
further increased to reach over 10,000 in 2013 and more than 15,000 in 2014, as 
shown in Figure 1.2.   
 
Figure 1.2: Number of Vulnerabilities Reported Over 20 Years 
 
Securing web applications has become incredibly important as the information 
processed by web applications has become critical to corporations, customers, 
organisations, and countries. Web-based attacks are considered by security experts to 
be the greatest and oftentimes the least understood of all risks related to 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity (Ravikiran Kalava, 2012). The purpose of a 
web-based attack is significantly different from other attacks. In more traditional 
penetration testing exercises, a network or host is the target of attack. Web-based 
attacks focus on an application and function on Layer 7 of the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) model. John Pescatore of the Gartner group claims that nearly 
70% of all attacks occur at the application layer (Rights, 2001). All web application 




taking advantage of poor parameter checking or instruction spoofing. Application 
attacks have five fundamental categories (Rights, 2001): 
1. Spoofing: Spoofing is the act of mimicking another user or process to 
perform a task or retrieve information that would normally not be allowed. 
An attacker could use a crafted HTTP request containing the session ID 
information of another user and retrieve the targeted user‟s account 
information (Persis, Nazareth, Dharmaraj, & Neil, 2014). 
2. Repudiation: To tie specific actions of a single user, applications must have 
reasonable repudiation controls such as web access, authentication, and 
database transaction logs. Without corroborating logs, online web application 
users could easily claim that they did not transfer equities from one account 
to an external account of another. Without proof, all online brokerages would 
be required to reimburse the client for their lost funds. Aggregating and 
correlating logs from multiple sources (web application, middleware, and 
database) can prevent repudiation attacks (B. Wu, Chen, Wu, & Cardei, 
2007).  
3. Information Disclosure: Information disclosure is one of the biggest threats 
to large organisations that maintain private information about their customer 
base. When attackers can reveal private information about a user or users of a 
website, consumer confidence in that organisation can take drastic hits, 
thereby causing loss in sales, stock price, and overall marketability. To 
prevent this, applications require adequate controls to prevent the 
manipulation of user IDs and sessions (Chester & Srivastava, 2011).   
4. Evaluation of Privileges: Authorisation controls, which are both reliable and 




information. Escalation of privileges requires a malicious user to either 
already possess or gain through unlawful methods the authorisation privileges 
of a regular user. Once the malicious user is logged into the victim system, an 
attempt will be made to exploit an application through poor parameter 
checking or instruction spoofing. (Crist, 2007).  
5. Denial of Service: DoS attacks are likely the most well-known of all 
application attacks. They are often generated by malicious users, competitors, 
or script kiddies. Motivations for this type of an attack range from personal to 
political reasons in hopes of stifling an organisation‟s ability (Rights, 2001). 
Attacks launched over the web can be carried out from anywhere in the world. 
Unfortunately, no web-based application service is immune to these attacks. 
Therefore, the reliability and security of web applications are issues that affect not 
only online businesses, but also the national security. The new paradigm of these 
attacks, known as “malware,” has become one of the most insidious threats in the 
world. 
1.2.1 Malware 
Over the last decade, malware has been the most intrusive security threat on the 
Internet and has risen to become a primary source for most of the scanning DDoS 
activities (Zhou & Jiang, 2012). 
Malware is malicious software used by cybercriminals and hacktivists to 
disrupt computer operations, steal personal or professional data, bypass access 
controls, and cause harm to the host system. Malwares are of many different classes 




Some of the most visible and serious problems facing the Internet today 
depend on malicious software and tools. Spamming, phishing, DoS attacks, botnets, 
and worms largely depend on some form of malicious code, which is commonly 
referred to as malware (Rudd, Rozsa, Gunther, & Boult, 2016). Malware is often 
used to infect the computers of unsuspecting victims by exploiting software 
vulnerabilities or tricking users into running malicious codes. Among the various 
forms of malicious software, botnet has been recently distinguished to be among the 
primary threats to computing assets. Like the previous generations of computer 
viruses and worms, bot is a self-propagating application that infects vulnerable hosts 
through direct exploitation or Trojan insertion. A detailed discussion of botnet is 
presented in the next section (C. Li, Jiang, & Zou, 2009). 
 
1.2.2 Botnet 
One form of the malware application is known as a bot. It is generated to 
automatically perform a specific operation, with the infected machine often being 
called a “zombie”. (Arshad, Abbaspour, Kharrazi, & Sanatkar, 2011). Defrauding 
users into making drive-by downloads, exploiting web browser vulnerabilities, or 
tricking users into running Trojan are ways to help cybercriminals execute the 
malicious software needed to recruit a computer into a bot (Soltani, Seno, 
Nezhadkamali, & Budiarto, 2014).  
Multiple bots that communicate with each other are called a “botnet”. It can 
help execute different types of attacks, such as DoS. The aim of a botnet is to control 
many computers, which is accomplished by installing a backdoor in each of them. 




remote control, but are usually referred to as bots. Bots can be given orders by the 
controller, which is often known as the botmaster, to perform various tasks, such as 
sending spam mails, adware, or spyware; collecting confidential information, such as 
passwords or encryption keys; performing DDoS attacks; or just searching for further 
potential targets to be recruited into the botnet (Fabian & Terzis, 2007; Fuchs & 
Brunner, 2013). Figure 1.3 shows how the botmaster controls the botnet to perform 
an attack. 
 
Figure  1.1: Botnet Scenario 
 
1.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) 
DoS attacks are one of the oldest types of botnet activities, which pose a serious and 
permanent threat to users, organisations, and the infrastructure of the Internet. This 
type of attack is characterised by an intentional attempt by malicious users/attackers 
to completely disrupt or degrade the availability of services or resources to legitimate 




According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
recommendation X.800, DoS is the “prevention of authorized access to resources or 
delaying of time-critical operation”. (Telecom, 1996). The increasing velocity of 
such attacks has increased the risk of servers and network devices on the Internet. In 
February 2000, the first documented DoS-style attacks were launched when a 15-
year old hacker started a series of attacks against e-commerce sites, such as 
Amazon.com and eBay.com (Calce & Silverman, 2008).  
After DoS attacks are launched, the attacker eventually becomes aware of the 
defence mechanisms that are implemented to prevent and mitigate DoS attacks. To 
overcome the downfalls of aggregate DoS attacks, the attacker launches a new type 
of DoS attack, which uses distributed traffic to attack victims (DDoS). A DDoS 
attack is a multiple form of DoS attack. It is a large-scale coordinated attack on the 
availability of Internet services and resources. It uses the same technique as DoS but 
on a much larger scale and from more than one source and/or more than one location 
at the same time (Mirkovic, Dietrich, Dittrich, & Reiher, 2004). Figure 1.4 shows the 





Figure  1.2: DDoS Attack 
 
The DDoS attacks can be categorised into two classes as following: 
 Network-layer DDoS attacks: The attacker in network DDoS attacks 
attempts to disrupt legitimate users‟ connectivity by exhausting the victim 
network‟s bandwidth or by exploiting a specific feature in the victim 
protocol. Sometimes, the attacker, who typically uses IP spoofing, sends a 
large number of bogus packets to the victimised server. To establish this type 
of attacks, the attacker mostly uses a TCP, UDP, ICMP, or DNS protocol 
packet (S. Lee, Kim, & Kim, 2011). 
 Application-layer DDoS attacks: The attacker who targets the application 
layer attempts to exhaust the server resources, such as the CPU, memory, and 
disk space. In general, this type of attacks has the same impact to the services 
(disrupting the connectivity) because they target specific characteristics of 




HTTP-flooding attacks are well-known botnet type of application-layer DDoS 
attacks that cause severe damage to servers and even greater disruption to the 
development of newer Internet services. The situation becomes more serious when 
attackers try to mimic the flooding of legitimate user requests, which is known as 
flash crowds. 
 
1.2.4 Flash Event and Flash Crowds Attacks 
Flash crowd refers to a huge number of people who assemble in one place for the 
same reason for a brief time (Sachdeva & Kumar, 2014). In computer networks, flash 
crowd is a rush in traffic to a specific website over a comparatively short period. It 
happens due to special events, such as breaking news and release of a popular 
product. A flash event sometimes occurs when a popular website links to a smaller 
site, thereby causing a massive increase in traffic, which is also known as a flashdot 
effect (Pai, Druschel, & Zwaenepoel, 2012).  
Both flash events and the flashdot affect the network infrastructure and the 
server operation of websites because overcrowding at the network layer can prevent 
some user requests from reaching the server. The requests may reach the server after 
a considerable delay caused by packet loss and resend requests. Certain web server 
configurations and descriptions cannot handle the volume of the flash event requests. 
In the end, users who try to reach the website in a flash event will be disappointed 
due to the long wait or failure to reach the target. 
Flash crowd attacks attempt to make Internet resources and services 
unavailable to its intended users. A very common method of flash crowd attack 




it cannot respond to legitimate traffic. Moreover, flash crowd attacks attempt to do so 
by sending these external requests from many compromised machines (zombies, 
daemons, agents, slaves, etc.) distributed around the world. These legitimate-looking 
requests bring down the victim server by consuming scarce resources, for example, 
the CPU cycles, memory, and bandwidth of the victim machine or network (Bhatia, 
Mohay, Tickle, & Ahmed, 2011). Table 1.1 lists the differences between the flash 
event and the flash crowd attacks. 
Table 1.1: the difference between flash event and flash crowd 
CHARACTERISTIC FLASH CROWD FLASH CROWD 
ATTACK 
Traffic volume  Both have a noticeable increase in the number of 
requests. 
Number of clients 
and their 
distribution  
Caused mostly by an increase 
in the number of clients 
accessing the site. Client 
distribution can be expected 
to the follow population 
distribution among ISPs and 
network. 
Caused either by an 
increase in the number of 
clients or a particular client 
sending requests at a high 
rate. Client distribution 
across ISPs and networks 
does not follow population 
distribution. 
Cluster overlap Significant overlap between 
clusters a site sees before and 
during flash events. 
Cluster overlap is small. 
Per-client request 
rates 
Because a server usually 
becomes slower during the 
flash event, per-client request 
rates are lower during the 
flash event than usual. This 
indicates that legitimate 
clients are responsive to the 
performance of the server 
unlike flash crowd attackers 
who generate requests by pre-
determined time distribution. 
Some flash crowd attacks 
involve a few clients 
emitting very high request 
rates and a large number of 
clients generating a low 
request rate, but in both 
cases, the per-client request 
rate is stable during the 
attack and significantly 





1.3 Research Motivation 
More than ever, the dependency on web technology is increasing. Meanwhile, 
destructive attempts to disrupt web users are also increasing. Flash events and flash 
crowd attacks are among the most dangerous Internet threats. Like flash events, flash 
crowd attacks can also have a significant financial implication. An example of a 
recent flash event that caused a substantial financial loss occurred on the 20 
November 2012, when Click Frenzy, a national online shopping initiative in 
Australia, which is similar to the US-based Cyber Monday event, was launched after 
a heavy media and online publicity (Alsaleem, Manickam, Anbar, Alnajjar, & Saleh, 
2017). The website experienced a traffic volume many times that of its anticipated 
traffic volume, leading to a dramatic increase in page-load times and the failure of 
the website within minutes after its launch. The organisers of the website had pre-
arranged sales partnerships with leading Australian and international retailers and 
brands, many of whom had paid large amounts for advertisement and asked for a 
refund (Bhatia, 2013). 
Flash crowd attacks and flash events can both overload the server or the 
server‟s Internet connection and result in partial or complete failure. Unlike flash 
crowd attacks, which are simply malicious requests that do not have to be handled by 
a website, flash events consist of legitimate requests (Thapngam, Yu, Zhou, & 
Beliakov, 2011). The web server has the responsibility to try and handle as many 
requests as possible during a flash event. By doing so, the site may increase its 
overall profile on the web, thereby resulting in additional revenue. If a flash crowd 
attack occurs during a flash event, the web server should ignore flash crowd attack 
requests and handle the legitimate requests. This requires the website to be able to 




1.4 Research Problem 
The main challenge for the web server is to differentiate between a flash event 
request (from legitimate users) and a flash crowd attack request during a flash event 
because both have the same symptoms: (i) delayed response to legitimate users or (ii) 
complete crash of the web server (Jung et al., 2002). The existing techniques cannot 
differentiate between the flash event and flash crowd attack requests, thereby leading 
to low accuracy in terms of detecting flash crowd attacks. This limited capability can 
be attributed to the following reasons (J. Yu, Li, Chen, & Chen, 2007): 
1. The existing techniques for detecting flash crowd attacks do not consider all 
the features in a web access log file that can contribute in detecting flash crowd 
attacks, such as the timeslot monitoring model which will be explained in 
Chapter 2. 
2. The majority of the existing flash crowd attack detection methods that rely on 
analysing user requests in the web access log suffer from significant false 
positive and false negative requests because of the shortcomings in existing 
machine learning techniques. 
1.5 Research Objectives and Goal 
The main goal of this thesis is to propose an approach for flash crowd attack 
detection during flash events. The following objectives are set to achieve this goal: 
1. To identify the most contributed features in the detection of flash crowd attacks 
by conducting an experiment using the web access log and verifying the 
result by employing two different algorithms. 





3. To verify and validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of 
detection accuracy and compare it with existing approaches. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
The main contribution of this research is the proposed rule-based approach which is 
designed to detect flash crowd attacks during flash events at the application layer 
with a better detection accuracy rate. The contributions of the present research are as 
follows: 
1. An approach for the detection of flash crowd attacks against the Apache web 
server with a better detection accuracy rate. 
2. A hybrid approach to extract the most effective features that most contribute 
to the detection of flash crowd attacks during flash events.  
3. A rule-based mechanism to detect the anomalous behaviour of a flash crowd 
attack. 
1.7 Research Scope 
The proposed approach is motivated by the detection of flash crowd attacks against 
web servers at the application layer during a flash event. However, we are currently 
focused on the detection of flash crowd attack against Apache web servers. The 
rationale for focusing on Apache web servers is that nearly 70% of all web servers 
globally that are subject to such attacks target the Apache server, which runs 
predominantly on Linux. In addition, the proposed approach retrieves the common 
web access log file from the web server as an input data for use in detection. 
Furthermore, the proposed approach does not address the flash crowd attacks at the 




Table  1.1: research Scope and limitation 
Items Scope of Research 
Attacks type Flash Crowd Attack 
Target  Application Layer  
Period of attack During the Flash Event 
Server type Apache web-server 
Log file type Common web access log 
Request type GET Request 
Detection  Anomaly- based detection 
 
1.8 Research Methodology  
To achieve the goal of detecting flash crowd attacks during flash events and to fulfil 
the objective of this research as stated in Section 1.4, the research process is divided 
into four phases: (i) understanding the flash event and flash crowd concepts through 
a review of the literature, (ii) proposing a new approach to detect flash crowd attacks 
during flash events, (iii) designing and implementing the proposed approach, and (iv) 
testing and evaluating the result. Figure 1.5 illustrates the research phases. 
Figure  1.3: Step of Research Methodology 
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In the first phase, the research problem is clarified through the review of 
existing studies and understanding the background. This elucidates the dimension of 
the problem, the existing solution, and future scope to detect flash crowd attacks 
during flash events. 
In the second phase, the solution to the research problem is proposed. The 
solution consists of four steps to detect flash crowd attacks by improving the 
detection accuracy. The proposed approach employs a rule-based mechanism to 
detect flash crowd attacks during flash events. 
The third phase shows the design and the implementation of the proposed 
solution which uses the most contributed fields from the dataset to improve the 
efficiency in term of feature (field) selection, model training, and anomaly detection. 
The fourth phase is mainly concerned with testing and evaluating the result to 
achieve the research objective. The proposed approach is tested and evaluated based 
on its effectiveness in increasing the detection accuracy using a real dataset. The 
approach is compared with existing behaviour-based detection approaches of 
application-layer DDoS attacks during flash events. 
1.9 Thesis Organisation 
This thesis comprises six chapters: 
CHAPTER 1 presents the motivation, scope, objectives, and contributions of 
this work. This chapter also discusses the need for server-side protection strategies 




CHAPTER 2 discusses the research background and related studies. This 
chapter critically reviews the existing solutions for the detection of flash crowd 
attacks. Furthermore, this chapter comprehensively discusses the gaps in the research 
that has been performed. 
CHAPTER 3 explains the integrated phases of the proposed framework as 
well as the methods adopted for the detection of flash crowd attacks against web 
servers. 
CHAPTER 4 presents the design and implementation of the proposed 
framework. This chapter contains the design principles of the test bed and presents 
details regarding the dataset generation. This chapter also explains the 
implementation of the phases in detail. 
CHAPTER 5 reports the experiments and their results. It also presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the results achieved using the proposed framework. In 
addition, this chapter evaluates the performance of the proposed framework in 
comparison with existing schemes. 
CHAPTER 6 presents the conclusions drawn from our work and suggests 





CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The importance of addressing the problem of flash crowd attacks was described in 
Chapter 1. In this chapter, the background knowledge required for better 
understanding the problem is provided. The literature review in this thesis is 
organised into eight sections. The underlying concepts of the flash event and flash 
crowd attack are described in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, respectively. Section 2.4 
presents the classification of flash crowd attack detection approaches, and Section 
2.5 explains the supervised and unsupervised machine learning methods adopted for 
detecting the flash crowd attacks. Section 2.6 presents the related studies conducted 
in this area. Finally, Section 2.7 summarises the chapter, justifying the need for an 
efficient approach to detect the flash crowd attacks against web servers during flash 
events. 
 
2.2 Underlying Concept of Flash Event 
Over the past decade, advances in Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) have significantly transformed the way in which information is accessed and 
communicated, particularly via the Web (K. R. Lee, 2002). The range of services 
supported by ICT have constantly been expanding and in recent years have even 
included the control and monitoring of key systems such as power, water, gas, etc., 
also known as Critical Infrastructure (CI). This evolution of ICT has also entailed a 
significant dependence of society on the systems used for storing, processing, and 




information and communication systems directly affect, in one way or another, 
nearly all major aspects of contemporary society. 
The delivery of an online service can be adversely affected because of 
legitimate user activity without any malicious intent. Such situations arise when a 
large number of users concurrently access a web server, either following some 
newsworthy event (e.g., the Olympics, the 9/11 attacks), or as a result of redirection 
from widely followed websites such as Slashdot or other social media like Facebook 
or Twitter. These situations are called flash events (Ari, Hong, Miller, Brandt, & 
Long, 2003). These events represent anomalies in the normal Internet traffic with 
anomalous characteristics such as a substantial increase in the incoming network 
traffic, overloading of the servers providing the services, and a degradation in the 
delivery of a service (Bhatia, 2013). Flash events can also have a significant financial 
implication. A recent example of a flash event causing a substantial financial loss 
occurred on the 20th of November 2012, when Click Frenzy, a national online 
shopping initiative in Australia similar to the US-based Cyber Monday events, was 
launched after big media and online publicity. The website (clickfrenzy.com.au) 
experienced many times its anticipated traffic volume, leading to a dramatic increase 
in page-load times, and the failure of the website within minutes of its launch. 
Organisers of the website had pre-arranged sales partnerships with leading Australian 
and international retailers and brands, many of whom had paid large amounts for 
advertisements, which they asked to be refunded (Khanna & Sampat, 2015).  
Flash crowd attacks as a result of illegitimate user activities occur almost 
daily. Even favourite websites, such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and other popular 




opening case was the DDoS incident that targeted important websites such as the 
White House, FBI, DOJ, Recording Industry Association of America, Universal 
Music websites, and Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Company, 2014). During this 
attack, a total of 80 computers were compromised by the botnet and up to 250,000 
were infected with malware. The attack traffic consumed 45 gigabytes per second 
(Gbps), according to the 7th Annual Report from Arbor Company in 2010. The 
outage lasted for seven days and was the longest recorded in 2010. In 2011, the 
longest attack ever recorded was launched targeting a travel company; it lasted for 80 
days, 19 h, 13 min, and 5 s. The average duration of a DDoS attack is 9 h and 29 
min. In 2012, another large attack reported consumed 60 Gbps, whereas in 2013, the 
DDoS trend on the application layer raised again and registered 300 Gbps, and the 
DDoS attack continues in growing in 2014 reached to 400 Gbps. All the above 
numbers prove that the application-layer attack is the most dangerous and need to be 
prevented (Network, 2015). Figure 2.1 shows the dramatically increasing bandwidth 
consumption in DDoS attacks initiated by botnets, as provided by Arbor Networks.  
 
 





2.2.1 Flash Event Classification 
It is argued in this section that flash events may be divided into three broad 
categories: predictable, unpredictable, and secondary (Pai et al., 2012). In this 
section, brief descriptions of the three categories are presented. Figure 2.2 shows the 
three flash event categories. 
 
Figure  2.2: The Categories of Flash Crowd 
 
Predictable Flash Event: For this category, the time of occurrence can be 
expected, allowing network administrators to prepare for the flash event by using 
various provisioning techniques, such as the use of load-sharing mechanisms or 
Content Distribution Networks (CDNs). Some popular examples are product releases 
(e.g. by hi-tech companies like Apple), widely followed sporting events such as the 
Olympics, or online play-along websites for popular television programs, where the 
expected time of the incoming traffic burst is well known in advance. The time when 
the incoming traffic will hit its peak can also be accurately estimated, permitting 
better handling and provisioning in the case of such events. Moreover, most of the 
predictable flash events are directed against servers owned by big companies that can 
handle the constant load or use content-sharing techniques to mitigate the effects of 
flash events (Bhatia, Mohay, Schmidt, & Tickle, 2012). 
Unpredictable Flash Events: The time of occurrence of this type of flash 
event is entirely unexpected, and these events also cause a sudden and dramatic surge 
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in network traffic to a site that is supposed to describe the event or provide further 
leads. The term unpredictable flash event is used to describe the ensuing burst of 
network traffic. Provisioning for these events in advance is akin to preparing for 
natural catastrophes like a tsunami or an earthquake (Bhatia et al., 2011).  
Designing systems to handle unpredictable flash events is possible but may be 
economically infeasible due to their unpredictability and rarity. The 9/11 terror attack 
led to such an unpredictable flash event when major news websites like CNN and 
MSNBC were overwhelmed by the amount of incoming traffic, pushing their 
availability close to 0% within minutes after the event occurred. The start and peak-
load time of such events are unpredictable and sometimes difficult to identify even 
post hoc (Hu & Sandoval, 2001). 
Their frequencies of occurrence are relatively lower than that of predictable 
flash events. Figure 2.3 shows an example of an unpredictable flash event when the 
popular website Wikipedia experienced a sudden increase in its hourly hits following 
the death of Steve Jobs. Similar traffic was also observed following the death of 
Michael Jackson. 
 





Secondary Flash Events: These events usually occur when a brief article, 
along with a web link is posted on widely followed websites like Slashdot or 
Facebook. This link is often related to an interesting news item, although not as 
newsworthy as an event on a world-wide scale that causes an unpredictable flash 
event. This can capture the attention of a vast number of followers and redirect a 
high percentage of them to another website in search of additional information. 
When the usually user-posted articles contain links to poorly resourced websites, this 
can easily result in the redirection of an unprecedented amount of traffic to those 
small websites that exceeds their available resources and eventually cripples them. 
Once again, such events are unpredictable, and the peak-load time is likewise 
relatively difficult to predict. Provisioning for such events can be challenging but is 
more feasible than for unpredictable flash events, due to the smaller nature of the 
event (Anderson, 2008). 
The last decade has seen a large number of flash events resulting in website 
outages. The recent flash events are categorised according to the reason for traffic 
surge as follows (Dhingra & Sachdeva, 2014). 
Flash Events Due to Natural Disasters: In 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the 
eastern coast of the United States. The Internet usage on 31 October increased by 
114%. Netflix witnessed a traffic volume increase of 150%, while Skype witnessed a 
service increase of 122%, with notable spike Internet traffic for the day. 
Flash Event due to Sports: The 2010 FIFA World Cup, in South Africa, had 
Internet traffic exceed all the previous records. The leading social website, Twitter, 
became the primary victim. Normally, it saw 750 tweets per second on an average 




was scored. These traffic spikes overburdened Twitter‟s internal network capacity. It 
saw outages and maintenance downtime throughout the World Cup. 
Flash Event due to the launch of new software product: According to 
TechCentral, Ireland‟s technology news resource, a unique breakdown occurred at 
Microsoft, in June 2014 when Exchange Online and Lync Online, part of Microsoft 
Office 360, were unavailable for hours together. The previously unknown flaw had 
been detected in the directory partition due to which a large number of customers 
could not access the email services. Even though connectivity was resumed, the 
resulting traffic surge overwhelmed a large number of network elements, thus 
leading to the unavailability of the Lync functionality for a little longer time. 
On 18 September, 2013, Apple launched iOS7. Upon the release, these 
updates caused almost 20% of total network traffic. Thousands of students at various 
universities in the US began to download it. This led to traffic surges as high as five 
times the normal traffic levels. Student newspapers also reported outages or 
slowdown of campus networks. 
Flash event due to celebrities: The websites of celebrities also sometimes get 
affected by flash events. In August 2013, an unusual trigger caused all the previous 
records of the Twitter‟s tweets-per-second to be destroyed. It was the broadcast of 
anime master Hayao Miyazaki‟s most famous movie “Castle in the Sky”. Hundreds 
and hundreds of Japanese fans of the movie tweeted a magic word used in the classic 
anime (short for animation), all at once. The word typed was “balse” spoken during 
the movie‟s climax scene. The flood of tweets peaked at 143,199 tweets-per-second. 
Other websites such as Amazon, PlayStation, KFC, and Nissan experienced the 
failure as soon as the button was pressed. 
